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Table 1 Main actors, original and modified roles, and influence in the allocation and management of Seguro Popular financial resources

From: Understanding the dynamics of the Seguro Popular de Salud policy implementation in Mexico from a complex adaptive systems perspective

Actor

Objective/iIncentives

Role in the system

Power

Policy responses

Source

National Commission of the Health Social Protection Policy (considered in the guidelines and had the same role as originally intended)

Ensure that the policy achieves its desired goals

To manage financial resources and transfer them to the states

Coordinate the operation

Stewardship

To evaluate the REPSS performance as well as the overall system.

To support the accountability of funds

High but without legal capacity of sanctioning

It can delay disbursement of funds, e.g., if financial reports are not received

It cannot act if they detect mishandling of resources

-Adapted and modified the policy

-Changed the definition of capitation from family to individual

-Accepted the state’s 15 % financial share to be represented by previous investments

-Introduced a cap on spending on medicines (30 %) and hiring (40 %)

-Families belonging to III and IV deciles were exempted from pre-payment

[24, 42]

State government treasury (not explicitly mentioned in the original guidelines but having a role)

Provide a mechanism for auditing the flow of funds

Receive funds from the National Commission and register them in the state’s financial system

High because of legal capacity to handle finances and sanctioning

-Kept funds as much as they can to obtain bank interests

[22, 23]

State Ministry of Health (considered in the guidelines but its role changed)

Provide health services through its public network

Receive funds and allocate according to capitation

High, e.g., in terms of fund allocation according to their priorities and network since it substituted the original role of REPSS

-Kept REPSS inside its structure to keep hold of federal financial resources

-Did not implement capitation but maintained historical budget due to lack of information and managerial capacity

-Initially issued short staff contracts to reduce costs but under pressure had to extend contracts

-Limited private sector purchasing of services

[22, 33, 43]

State Health Social Protection Regime (REPSS) (considered in the guidelines but changed its role)

Original: Purchasing of services from public and private in an equitable and efficient way

Revised (except in one state): ensure the highest number of affiliates registered and reported to bring more funds to the state

Original: financial intermediary

Affiliate new users

Protect users’ rights

Management of financial resources

Purchasing of services,

Accountable to state and federal authorities

Revised (except in one state):

Administering the funds from affiliating new people into the plan.

Transfer this information to the National Commission

To participate in the allocation of resources to public health units

Low power or influence in allocation of funds

Their role shrunk over time by being absorbed by the state MOH

Although they existed under the MOH, they became increasingly passive

-Increased number of affiliated families, e.g., by re-interpreting the guidelines to identify single member families, to increase the funds allocated to the state

[43, 44]

National Workers Union (not considered in the guidelines but acquired an active role)

Represent the interests of unionized workers towards the employer

Negotiate the regularization of contracts.

Monitor the process of regularization

High: Every regularized worker pays a 2 % fee of the value of the contract to receive protection from the union (contracts consumes between 40–60 % of the system’s total SP funds)

-Became active in the regularization of contracts process by negotiating with top federal players

[23, 24]

Contracted workers

(not considered in the guidelines but having active role)

Obtain contracts to provide services

Participate in the delivery of services to the SP affiliated population

Low: they did not put pressure to obtain better contracts

Became active in the regularization of contracts process by accepting new contracts negotiated by the union

[23]

Pharmaceutical retailers (Not considered in the guidelines but having an active role)

Participate in bids and sell their products

Negotiate the selling price of medicines with each state

High: there are limited number of retailers and they lobby to agree on medicine pricing levels

-Depending on the state, retailers negotiated highly profitable contracts

-Used their corporative and marketizing capacity to sell their products and to agree on drug prices used in bids

[23, 45]

Pharmaceutical distributors (NEW) (not considered in the guidelines but acquired an active role)

Win the bid for distributing drugs within the state

Negotiate to win the bid

Low—as there is more competition

-Used different marketing strategies to win distribution bids and to convince the states that they could reduce allocation times despite the cost involved.

[23]

State health bureaucracy (considered in the guidelines and had an active role)

As possible:

-Use funds to cover its needs

-Continue to function as before

Management of Seguro Popular funds at different levels and activities

High—in terms of flexibility to manage and spend funds

As initially no sanction system existed (before auditing started in 2009), some:

1. Bought medicines at high prices

2. Bought non-authorized goods

3. Contracted health workers without demonstrated competence

[23, 24]

Health units (providers) (considered in the guidelines but had a passive role)

Provide health services according to population needs and their capacity

Receive resources and provide services to the affiliated population

No power as they do not receive any funds directly

-No incentive to change status quo—business as usual

-Complained about not being heard or participate actively in the allocation process or decision—e.g., responding to the health challenges they face

[22, 23, 43]

Beneficiaries affiliated to Seguro Popular (considered in the guidelines and acquired an active role)

Original:

Had the right to choose providers

Current:

In practice, cannot exert that right as they have to deal with limited number of providers (mostly public sector)

Recipients of health services contained in the package of benefits

Low but increasing—e.g., if they organize themselves to exert more pressure

-As they received information about their rights, they increasingly became more vocal in obtaining better services and medicines

[24, 44]